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for the agent to accept the service of process. Hence, the holding
clearly shows that there is a difference in a state appointing an agent
for service of process and the parties themselves appointing an agent
for service of process.
The decision in the principal case making the agency valid may
open the doors in the future to a great deal of litigation on this
matter. Other big businesses may start putting clauses in all of their
interstate contracts specifying a "sham" agent to accept service of
process for the other party. If the parties were on an equal footing as
far as bargaining power is concerned than it would seem that the
result of the principal case would be more easily accepted. But, as in
the principal case, where the bargaining power greatly favors the
plaintiff, there is some doubt that the defendant, by having the
form lease forced upon him, actually gave his consent to be sued
in a foreign state and waive his constitutional right to be sued in his
home state.
William Walter Smith

Criminal Law-Extradition for Nonsupport
Petitioner, a New Hampshire resident, instituted habeas corpus
proceedings to obtain release from custody. Massachusetts had
brought extradition proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act. A hearing in New Hampshire resulted
in a refusal of extradition. Thereafter, Massachusetts brought proceedings under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act against petitioner to answer criminal charges for the nonsupport of his alleged
illegitimate child born in Massachusetts in 1953 shortly after the
mother had moved there from New Hampshire. The mother married
sometime thereafter and continued to reside in Massachusetts. The
petitioner was never within the state of Massachusetts. In 1962
the mother requested public support and as a result Massachusetts
officials started extradition proceedings. Held, writ granted. Massachusetts could not impose on a New Hampshire resident never
present in Massachusetts an obligation to support an alleged illegitimate child nor make his failure to support criminal. Under the law
of New Hampshire, no duty to support an illegitimate child arises
unless a suit to determine paternity is instituted within one year after
the birth of the child. The dissent stated that section 6 of the Uniform
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Criminal Extradition Act applied and that petitioner could be extradited. Hardy v. Betz, 195 A.2d 582 (N.H. 1963).
The basis for extradition is found in the Constitution of the United
States. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. Constitutional extradition proved
too limited since it affected only "fugitives" who had fled from the
demanding state. State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894),
recognized the authority of a state to enact legislation for extraditing
criminals on less exacting terms than those provided by the Constitution. Thus through legislation and judicial decisions, the states
built up bodies of law which were different throughout the country.
See Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944).
In 1926 the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, (Uniform Extradition Act). This act has been adopted in substance by
most of the states. The Uniform Extradition Act was designed to
provide consistency among the states and to cover areas of extradition not provided for in the Constitution. Under sections 5 and 6
of the act, a criminal was made a "fugitive" and his extradition from
the state where the act was committed to the state where the act had
its criminal effect, was provided for. The Uniform Extradition Act
was amended in 1932 to provide extradition of that person not only
from the state in which he acted, but also from any state into which
he later fled. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 261 (1957); UNIFORM CRIMINAL ExTRADITION ACT §§ 5, 6.
In nonsupport matters extradition proved unsatisfactory in many
cases. It removed the obligor from gainful employment, placed a
criminal stigma on him, and tended to destroy any possibility of a
reconciliation. 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 14 (1952). The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, (Uniform Support Act) was
adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1950 to
alleviate such problems. Thirty-five states have adopted some form
of this act. 9c UNiFORM LAWS ANN. 9 (1963 Cum. Supp.).
Section 5 of the Uniform Support Act, which is in the criminal
section, was designed to relieve the extradition process of the
narrow requirement that the obligor, whose surrender is demanded,
must have been in the demanding state at the time the acts of nonsupport were committed. The obligor is subject to extradition to the demanding state even though he was not in demanding state during
the period for which nonsupport was sought and has not fled there-
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from. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT

§ 5;

Sinclair v. Sinclair, 196 Tenn. 538, 268 S.W.2d 576 (1954). However, this section of the act is qualified by sections 6 and 7.
Under section 6 the obligor may submit his case to the courts
of the state in which he was present during the time for which nonsupport is sought. Then by the authority given this state by section 7
of the act, its courts can make a determination under its law as to
whether the obligor is under a duty to support, and if a duty is found,
these courts can determine the amount. The obligor can pay this
amount into court according to the payment schedule set up by the
court and be relieved of extradition. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 6, 7; Ex parte Susman, 116 Cal.
App. 2d 698, 254 P.2d 161 (1953). These two sections of the Uniform Support Act would remedy the problem of taking the obligor
away from gainful employment and sending him back to a state
where he has no job.
In the instant case under New Hampshire law, no duty to support
an illegitimate child arises unless a paternity suit be instituted within
one year of the birth of the child. N.H. REv. STAT. ch. 168, § 1
(1955). However, under Massachusetts law, the determination of
paternity is not a prerequisite to indictment for nonsupport. This
question may be settled in the nonsupport proceedings. MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 273, § 15 (1956). The Uniform Support Act anticipated
conflict of laws problems and the act was designed to clear them up.
Since the obligor was present in New Hampshire during the time for
which support was sought, New Hampshire Law would govern and
no duty to support arose. Under the Uniform Support Act as adopted
by New Hampshire, there appears to be no way the petitioner can
be made liable for the support of his alleged illegitimate child and
thus there are no grounds for extradition.
The dissenting judge's view that section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Act applied and that petitioner could be extradited is not supported by authority. The only authority found in point is to the
contrary. Buck v. Britt, 187 Misc. 217, 62 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1946),
which was decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Support Act,
held that an obligor could not be extradited to the demanding state,
under the Uniform Extradition Act, when he had never been present
in demanding state. The obligor, a New York resident, married the
obligee while on military duty in California. He was later sent overseas for duty and afterwards returned to New York. His wife re-
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mained in California and later moved to Minnesota where the proceedings for extradition were initiated. The court stated that it could
not be claimed that the obligor had committed in New York or any
third state an act which intentionally resulted in a crime in the state
of Minnesota. The obligor had never been present in Minnesota and
the court of Minnesota had no jurisdiction over the person of the
obligor. Extradition could not be properly granted by the responding
state because it could not be said that the obligor committed any crime
in the demanding state.
West Virginia has adopted the Uniform Extradition Act and the
Uniform Support Act with little variation from those proposed by the
commissioners. The Uniform Extradition Act which was enacted
in 1937 is now W. VA. CODE ch. 5, art. 1, §§ 7-13 (Michie 1961).
The Uniform Support Act which was enacted in 1950 is now W. VA.
CODE ch 48, art. 9, §§ 1-20 (Michie 1961).
The court in the instant case based refusal of extradition on lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the obligor. The court reasoned
that neither the Uniform Extradition Act nor the Uniform Support
Act gave the Massachusetts court jurisdiction. Section 6 of the
Uniform Extradition Act did not apply because Massachusetts could
not, by a legislative act, impose an obligation to support an illegitimate
child in Massachusetts and could not impose criminal liability for
failure to support such a child where the alleged father had never been
within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. The act of non-support was
not sufficient to give the demanding state jurisdiction. Further, the
Uniform Support Act did not give Massachusetts jurisdiction over
the person of the obligor because during the period for which support
was sought the obligor was not present within Massachusetts and no
obligation to support could arise under its laws. Thus the majority
opinion in the instant case appears to best protect the rights of the
individual obligor.
FredAdkins

Marshaling Claims---The Effect Of State Exemption Laws
On Collection Of Government Liens
P was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring the life of
X. This policy had a cash surrender value of 27,285.87 dollars, and
a face value of 50,000 dollars. B, bank, had a senior lien on the
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